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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court properly deny plaintiffs motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)?
A denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Trial courts have discretion to determine whether a mistake of law existed, and the
appellate court shall reverse only if there has been an abuse of that discretion. Thus, reversal is
only indicated where the trial court's ruling is based upon a misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law and where a correct application would have produced a different result. Ferris v.
Jennings. 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-35 and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) are implicated
in this matter and reproduced in full in Addendum A of Appellee's brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil case wherein the plaintiff sought
damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile accident. Plaintiff filed her
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complaint on January 10,1994. (R. 3). Defendant filed an answer on March 28,1994. (R. 6).
Defendant's Answer included the following affirmative defense:
Further pleading, Defendant maintains that the present action is barred by the
Statute of Limitations. (R. 6).
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment claiming the action was barred by the statute of
limitations on April 20,1994. (R. 19). Plaintiff opposed defendant's motion for summary
judgment arguing that defendant's answer had not adequately raised the statute of limitations
defense. Such Memorandum in Opposition was filed May 20,1994, thirty days after defendant's
initial motion for summary judgment. (R. 39).
Defendant moved for leave to amend his answer to allege the statute of limitations with
more particularity. (R. 41). The court granted defendant's motion for leave to amend (R. 76)
and defendant filed his amended answer on July 7,1994. Plaintiff has not appealed the trial
court's granting leave to amend defendant's answer. Although defendant gave notice and took
the deposition of plaintiff, plaintiff made no effort to depose the defendant. (R. 17).
Subsequent to the defendant filing his amended answer, defendant once again moved for
summary judgment. (R. 87). On review of the motion, the trial court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment by memorandum decision on September 6,1994, almost nine
months after plaintiffs complaint was filed and six months after defendant's initial answer
alleging the statute of limitations defense was filed. (R. 126). The final order in this matter was
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entered on September 30,1994. (R. 128). No Rule 56(f) affidavit setting forth the basis for
further discovery was ever filed.
On October 11,1994, plaintiff filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). (R. 130). The trial court by memorandum decision denied that
motion, and a final order thereupon was entered April 26,1995. (R. 160). Plaintiff filed her
notice of appeal on May 25, 1995. (R. 162).
In plaintiffs principal brief, plaintiff sets forth a statement of facts which is essentially
irrelevant to this matter. The case was decided on procedural grounds, and therefore the
foregoing outline of the course of proceedings constitutes the only relevant facts. It is important
to note however that the plaintiff admits that she retained an attorney in the spring of 1992,
almost a year before the statute of limitations expired. (R. 90,102,107-08). Plaintiffs recitation
of the facts evidences that she received two letters from State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, both pertaining to Personal Injury Protection Benefits. However, both
letters were in reference to plaintiffs first party claim for no-fault benefit and had nothing to do
with plaintiffs third party claim against defendant Hall. Both letters reference claim number 440676-200, which lists the insured as Marion Lund. (R. 24) The present action is against Elton
Hall for personal injuries, a third party claim. Therefore, whether the letters from State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company advised Rallet Lund of any deadline for submitting an
application for PIP benefits or any statute of limitations applying to the PIP benefits is irrelevant.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court granted summary disposition limiting plaintiff to raising issues arising out of
the denial of her Rule 60(b) motion. Normally, the standard of review for the denial of a Rule
60(b) motion is for abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, the plaintiff has claimed that the standard
of review for this appeal is for correctness. In reality, two standards of review should be applied
to the trial court's denial of the 60(b) motion in this case. Only the court's application or
understanding of the applicable law is to be reviewed for correctness. All other issues attendant
thereto should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Otherwise, this Court's order as to the
summary disposition would be in reality meaningless.
The trial court's conclusion that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 is not applicable must be
sustained. The statute is inapplicable because the defendant was not "absent"fromthe state.
There is absolutely no evidence below to support the contention that the defendant departed or
was absent from the state. Further, under this Court's analysis in Snyder v. Chine. 390 P.2d 915
(Utah 1964), applying the Utah Non-Resident Motor Vehicle Act, § 78-11-35 cannot be used to
toll the applicable statute of limitations.
As stated, there exists no evidence that the defendant was at any time absentfromthe
state. The plaintiff has countered that she was not given the opportunity to discover if the
plaintiff was ever absent. However, the plaintiff failed to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit, and such
4

failure forecloses application of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. At no time has the plaintiff alleged
that she was precluded from filing a Rule 56 affidavit, and although the defendant conducted
discovery including taking the deposition of the plaintiff, the plaintiff at no time made any effort
to propound any discovery upon the defendant.
This Court should not accept the plaintiffs invitation to overrule Snyder v. Clune. As the
Utah Court of Appeals recognized in Van Tassell v. Shaffer. 742 P.2d 111 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
the majority position in the country, and the preferred rule by the Utah Court of Appeals, would
be that a defendant's absence does not toll the statute of limitations where the defendant is
amenable to personal jurisdiction. Such holding would be more consistent with the purposes of
statutes of limitation.
The plaintiff complains that at the time the statute ran she was in negotiations with
defendant's insurance carrier, and that therefore the defendant should be estopped from asserting
the statutes of limitations. The plaintiffs position must fail. First, there is absolutely no
evidence of any ongoing negotiations. Second, the plaintiff herself has filed an affidavit which
indicated that settlement negotiations had not yet commenced. Lastly, and most importantly, the
plaintiff failed to raise this issue below. No arguments or allegations of estoppel can be found
below. The Rice v. Granite School District case upon which the plaintiff relies is not cited
below. Because the matter was not raised below, this Court should not consider it.
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The plaintiff has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion. Because the
plaintiff has stated no viable reason for reversal, the trial court should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT GRANTED SUMMARY DISPOSITION LIMITING PLAINTIFF
TO RAISING ISSUES ARISING OUT OF THE DENIAL OF HER RULE 60(b)
MOTION
On October 2,1995, this Court entered an order in response to defendant's motion for

summary disposition. That order provided:
Defendant's motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction in this Court due
to untimeliness of the appeal is granted with respect to issues concerning the
summary judgment only. Plaintiff is limited to raising issues arising out of the
denial of her 60(b) motion. The appeal was filed in a timely manner following
entry of that order.
See Order on file herein. The plaintiff in this matter essentially argues that because she has
claimed that a mistake of law was made below, the standard of review for the entire appeal is one
of correctness, instead of the usual abuse of discretion standard applied to the review of Rule
60(b) motions. The standard of review to be applied in this case is not that simple.
The well established rule is that the trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a
motion for relief from judgment under subdivision (b) of Rule 60, and its determination will not
be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. VijiL 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989); Katz v.
Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986); Russel v. MartelL 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). However, when
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a trial court's application of law is involved, the appellate court will review that application for
correctness. For example, this Court in Ferris v. Jennings. 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) held:
[W]hen the trial court has based its ruling upon a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law, where a correct one may have produced a different
result, the party adversely effected thereby is entitled to have the error rectified
and a proper adjudication under correct principles of law.
Id at 859. The Utah Court of Appeals in Bishel v. Merritt. 907 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
explained:
Trial courts have discretion to determine whether a mistake of law existed, and we
will reverse only if there has been an abuse of that discretion.
Id. at 277. As the Ferris decision explains, even if there is a misapplication or misunderstanding
of the law it will merit reversal only "where a correct one may have produced a different
result...." Ferris v. Jennings. 595 P.2d at 859.1
Thus, there are really two standards of review to be applied to the trial court's denial of
the Rule 60(b) motion in this case. As to all decisions of the trial court, except its interpretation
and application of the law, such decisions are review for an abuse of discretion. As to any claim
by the plaintiff that the trial court misapplied or misunderstood the applicable law, the plaintiff is
entitled to a reversal only if the plaintiff can show both that the court misapplied the law and that

1

See for example Gaw v. State bv and through DOT. 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(Where the Court of Appeals held that although a court had erroneously excluded testimony on a
legal basis, since the testimony would not have resulted in a different verdict the error was
harmless).
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such misapplication of the law would have brought about a different result. This the plaintiff
cannot do.
H.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§78-12-35 WAS NOT APPLICABLE MUST BE SUSTAINED
There is no dispute in this matter that the automobile accident at issue occurred on

January 12, 1989. See plaintiffs complaint at R. 3. There is likewise no dispute that the
plaintiff filed her complaint on January 10,1994, almost five years after the subject accident.
(See plaintiffs Brief at R. 3). Plaintiff claims she had filed a previous and identical complaint on
January 22, 1993, four years and four days after the subject accident. As a result, it is clear on its
face that plaintiffs complaint was filed after the applicable statute of limitations, Utah Code
Ann. §78-12-25 2 ,hadrun.
In denying plaintiffs Rule 60(b) motion, the trial court held that § 78-12-35 was not
applicable. This was a correct conclusion. Because this conclusion is correct, the court's ruling
must be sustained. The trial court did state that under § 78-12-35 the time of any absence from
the state would not toll the time for commencement of the action. (R. 157). The second sentence
of the statute simply provides otherwise.3 However, the court's overall conclusion that the

2

Salt Lake Citv v. Industrial Comm.. 81 Utah 213, 17 P.2d 239 (1932) (cause of action
for personal injury sounding in negligence must be brought within four years).
3

Such a minor deviation does not mandate reversal. In questioning whether a trial court
has abused its discretion in denying a Rule 60(b) motion, the trial court should be sustained if the
ruling can be sustained on any ground, even one not relied upon by the trial court. See e^g. re:
8

statute does not apply is correct for several reasons. The statute is inapplicable in this case
because the defendant was not "absent" from the state under this Court's decision in Snyder v.
Clune. 390 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964). Likewise, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 cannot be applied to
this matter because there is absolutely no evidence in the record that the defendant was absent
from the state at any time. Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion that § 78-12-35 did not
apply was correct. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
III.

PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO FILE A RULE 56(fl AFFIDAVIT FORECLOSES
APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-12-35

In order for the court to even apply Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, the court must first find
that there is some evidence in the record to indicate that the defendant was absent from the state.
There simply exists no such evidence. The plaintiffs complaint establishes that the accident at
issue occurred on January 12,1989. The face of plaintiff s complaint indicates that it was filed
on January 18, 1994.4 defendant's motion for summary judgment was therefore supported by the
record in that four years had run since the date of the accident without a complaint being filed.
This was the basis for the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

summary judgment involving a higher standard of review, White v. Deseelhorst 879 P.2d 1371
(Utah 1994); West v. Thomson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999, 1012 n. 22 (Utah 1994).
4

Of course, the plaintiff maintains that she filed an earlier complaint on January 22,1993,
after the statute of limitations had run.
9

In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that the statute of
limitations had been tolled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. However, the plaintiff
provided absolutely no evidence that the defendant had been absent from the state at any time.
Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations had been not properly pled and
had been waived as a defense. Lastly, the plaintiff argued that the parties were in settlement
negotiations and that the defendant's insurer acted in bad faith and that since the eventual
lawsuit should not have come as a surprise to the defendant, the statute of limitations should not
be applied.
Of course, the plaintiff could cite no legal authority for such a conclusion. Interestingly,
the affidavit filed by the plaintiff in opposition to summary judgment highlights that no ongoing
settlement negotiations were occurring. In paragraph six of her affidavit, the plaintiff states:
Your affiant expected, from her accounts with State Farm Insurance, that after my
medical condition had stabilized and I presented the medical costs to State Farm
Insurance Company, that they would enter into settlement negotiations for my
claim for personal injuries.
(R. 27). In other words, settlement negotiations had not even commenced. The plaintiff
indicates that in 1992 she contacted State Farm Insurance Company, specifically the PIP
adjuster, and was told that her file was still open. This may or may not have been the case. In
any event, the status of her personal injury protection file at her own insurance company is not
germane to the present lawsuit.
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In the four years following the accident which is the subject of this litigation, neither
plaintiff nor her attorney took any steps to protect her rights, although the opportunity to act was
always present. Even if settlement negotiations had commenced, a reasonable attorney would
have ensured that his client's claim was protected. Plaintiffs counsel had ample opportunity to
protect plaintiffs rights before the statute of limitations ran. Had plaintiffs counsel acted
prudently, plaintiff would not now come before this Court asking that the statute of limitations be
weakened to cure a perceived injustice.
The plaintiff did suggest in her pleadings that further discovery might show that the
defendant had been absentfromthe state. However, the plaintiff herself stated:
If plaintiff does not discover that defendant has been out of the state as believed,
defendant can renew its motion.
(R. 36). Thus, the plaintiff did not really have any basis to believe that the defendant had, in fact,
been absent from the state. More importantly, the plaintiff failed to provide any basis for the
court to deny the motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the plaintiff never filed an
affidavit stating what additional discovery was needed as required by Rule 56(f) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court should note that defendant's initial answer alleging the
statute of limitations as a defense was filed on March 28, 1994. (R. 6). Defendant's motion for
summary judgment was not ruled on until his answer had been amended several months later. In
all of this time, the plaintiff never propounded a single interrogatory upon the defendant, never
gave notice of a deposition, or in any way attempted to conduct any discovery whatsoever. In
11

contrast, the defendant took the opportunity to depose the plaintiff (R. 17). Additionally, the
defendant propounded upon the plaintiff both a set of interrogatories and requests for production
of documents. (R. 9 and 10). The plaintiff in this matter simply did not attempt to make the
discovery she now claims is critical.
Even if the plaintiff had purposely chosen not to make discovery during the time between
the filing of defendant's initial answer and the court's ruling on the motion for summary
judgment, at a minimum the plaintiff should have filed a Rule 56 affidavit as required by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In Sandv Citv v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), the Utah Court of Appeals held:
A Rule 56(f) movant must file an affidavit to preserve his or her contention that
summary judgment should be delayed pending further discovery.
kL at 488 (citing Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).
Accordingly, plaintiff has wholly failed to preserve her contention that summary judgment
should have been delayed pending further discovery, or that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying plaintiffs 60(b) motion.
This Court in Jackson v. Layton Citv. 743 P.2d 1196,1198 (Utah 1987), refused to
consider an argument that further discovery was necessary because the appellant had failed to file
a Rule 56(f) affidavit. In fact, this matter should be handled just as the court did in Jackson. In
Jackson, the Jackson family had paid a fee and was riding down a hill together on tubes in the
snow when Gene Jackson struck a metal pole and suffered serious injuries. This Court held that
12

the only possible statute of limitations under which the Jacksons could bring their claims was
§ 78-12-25.5, which applies a seven year statute period of limitations to injuries caused by
defective or unsafe improvements to real property. In Jackson. Layton City provided the
affidavit of the Parks Foreman for Layton City that all of the improvements on the sledding hill
had been put in prior to November 28, 1974 and that therefore by the time the action was
commenced on August 14,1983, the seven year period of limitations had run. This Court
explained:
The Johnsons argue, nevertheless, that the pole was possibly part of a later
installation, renovation, or addition which they assert would extend the
completion date for the purposes of the statute. They ask this Court to reverse the
summary judgment ruling to allow them to conduct discovery of their own. The
issue is not properly raised. The Jacksons did not seek a continuance of a
summary judgment proceeding pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) in
the trial court. The Jacksons do not allege that they were precluded from filing a
Rule 56 affidavit. Accordingly, we do not consider the argument.
Id at 1198. Likewise, in this case this Court should not consider the arguments that further
discovery was needed. At no time has the plaintiff alleged that she was precluded from filing a
Rule 56(f) affidavit, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant was at any
time absent from the state. For this reason, Utah Code Annotated §78-12-35 simply has no
application. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion.
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IV.

EVEN IF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-12-35 WERE APPLICABLE.
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING SHOULD BE SUSTAINED
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-35 provides:
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, the
action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his
return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the
time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action.

This Court in Snvder v. Clune. 390 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964) held that when a defendant leaves the
state following a motor vehicle accident, § 78-12-35 does not apply to toll the statute of
limitations. In Snyder, a Utah County resident was injured in an automobile accident with a
resident of California. The plaintiff did not commence the action until four years and three days
later. The plaintiff then sought to avoid the statute of limitations by citing § 78-12-35.
In its analysis, the Snyder court reviewed the Non-Resident Motorist Act and determined
that process could have been served on the defendant because the Act authorized service upon an
absent defendant by serving the Secretary of State. The Court reasoned that since the defendant
was available for service of process through an agent authorized by law to receive service of
process, she was not "absent" from the state in the sense contemplated by the statute. Id.
Therefore, the plaintiff at no time was prevented from commencing her action and there is no
reason to toll the running of the statute. Id
The Snyder court concluded its decision by stating:
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[W]here the plaintiff could have pursued her remedy at any time she desired, she
was obliged to commence her action within the statute of limitations or it is
barred.
I d at 917. It is important to note that the Non-resident Motor Act, currently found in Utah Code
Ann. § 41-12a-505, provides in pertinent part:
The use and operation by a non-resident or his agent, or of a resident who has
departed Utah, of a motor vehicle on Utah highways is an appointment of the
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code as the true and lawful attorney
for service of legal process in any action or proceeding against him arising from
the use or operation of a motor vehicle over Utah highways which use or
operation results in damages or loss to person or property.
(emphasis added). Thus, if this Court compares the language of § 78-12-35 with § 41-12a-505,
one finds that a resident of the State of Utah who has departed Utah can be served through the
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. Accordingly, any time that a resident is within
the state following a motor vehicle accident the plaintiff can serve him personally. When that
resident departs the State of Utah, such resident can be served via the Division of Corporations
and Commercial Code. As a result, at no time is a resident of the State of Utah absent and the
Court's holding in Snyder v. Chine is applicable.
Additionally, the Snyder decision and the policy reasons behind statutes of limitations
mandate a conclusion that § 78-12-35 has no application to the present case. In Snyder, the
Court looked directly towards § 78-12-35 and stated:
It is to be conceded that upon a superficial look at this above section, and ignoring
all other considerations, its literal wording might seem to indicate that where
defendant departs from the state after a cause of action arises, the time of his
15

absence should not be counted as a part of the time of limitation. But statutes of
necessity must state their objectives in general language. It is not always possible
to foresee and prescribe in precise detail for all situations to which they might
apply. Attempts to give them universal literal application frequently lead to
incongruent results which were never intended. When it is obvious that this is so,
the statutes should not be so applied. In order to give a statute its true meaning
and significance it should be considered in light of its background and the purpose
sought to be accomplished, together with other aspects of the law which have
bearing on the problem involved.
Id at 915-16. The Court then held:
It is obvious that the objective of the statute above quoted was to prevent a
defendant from depriving a plaintiff of the opportunity of suing him by absenting
himself from the state during the period of limitation.
I d at 916. The Court went on to explain that because the Secretary of State is an agent of the
non-resident motorist and may receive process for him the policy of the statute would not be met
by tolling the period of limitation. The Court held:
The defendants thus had an agent within the state upon whom process could have
been served for them, and they were thus not "absent" from the state in the sense
contemplated by the statute, that is, unavailable for the service of process.
Id at 916. This Court should note that the language of § 41-12a-505 provides that the Secretary
of State is the agent for service of process for residents and non-residents alike. Such a
construction comports with this Court's previous views on statutes of limitations.
This Court explained the need for statutes of limitation in Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572
(Utah 1993). Generally, concerning statutes of limitation, this Court stated:
The fixing of a limitations period is highly judgmental and is determined by the
Legislature's weighing a number of general policies, such as whether particular
16

types of cases require a speedy resolution, the nature of the evidence typically
used in litigating the particular type of case, the consequence to putative plaintiffs,
defendants, and third persons who might be effected by the litigation, and the
interest of society at large in not having disputes resolved for long periods of time.
Such policy considerations often suggest different limitations periods for different
causes of action, even as to actions within the same general branch of the law.
Thus, the legislature has fixed different limitation periods for different types of
torts.
Id at 575. The Court went on to recognize that the legislature has broad latitude to set limitation
periods under the state and federal due process clauses.
Statutes of limitation provide an essential function in the legal system of the State of
Utah. As the Lee court recognized, the interest of society at large is in not leaving disputes
unresolved for long periods of time. When a trial court rules that a statute of limitations should
be tolled, such action should not be taken lightly. For at that moment, the bright line test upon
which society depends dims and the respective rights of plaintiffs, defendants, and other third
parties appear unsettled.
Not only should the Snyder case be affirmed, but this Court should consider the invitation
of the Utah Court of Appeals in Van Tassell v. Shafer. 742 P.2d 111 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), and
adopt the majority view and the Utah Court of Appeals' more preferred holding:
We must also assume that proceedings under the Non-Resident Motorist Act are
the only Utah proceedings in which the applicable statute of limitations is not
tolled by absence from the state until and unless the Utah Supreme Court states
otherwise. We observe, however, that the majority view, which holds that a
defendant's absence does not toll the statute of limitations where a defendant is
amenable to personal jurisdiction, would be preferred by this Court as the Utah
rule, as we find it more consistent with the purposes of statutes of limitations.
17

Llatll3.
In any event, because this action arose out of a motor vehicle accident, Utah Code Ann. § 78-1235 has no application. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion,
and therefore its order should be affirmed.
V.

THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND IN ANY EVENT
IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT MATTER.
In this matter, plaintiff filed an affidavit to support her arguments in opposition to

summary judgment that (1) the filing of the complaint should have been no surprise to the
defendants insurer, and (2) that defendants insurer acted in bad faith. Neither of those issues
were relevant to the motion for summary judgment, nor are they relevant in this Appeal.
However, plaintiff now has cited the Court to Rice v. Granite School District. 23 Utah 2d 22,456
P.2d 159 (1969) for the proposition that summary judgment should have been denied and the
issue of estoppel submitted to the jury for determination. This issue was simply not preserved
below.
A review of the record shows that at no point prior to the court granting summary
judgment or in plaintiffs motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) was the issue of estoppel or the Rice
case ever mentioned. This is not simply a problem of semantics. No theory of estoppel was
argued or alleged.
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely bring the issue to
the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an opportunity to rule on
the issue's merits. "Issues not raised in a trial court in timely fashion are deemed
18

waived, precluding [the appellate court] from considering their merits on appeal."
LeBaron & Associates. Inc. v. Rebel Entertainment 823 P.2d 479, 482-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(citation omitted) (quoting Salt Lake County v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653,655 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)).
The plaintiff in this matter gave the trial court absolutely no opportunity to address the
issue of estoppel or the case of Rice v. Granite School District. Because this matter was not
raised below, this Court should not consider it.
However, even if this Court does consider plaintiffs belated claim that estoppel should
be applied, plaintiffs argument fails. As the plaintiff notes, the court in Rice v. Granite School
District held that there was an issue of fact concerning whether the defendant was estopped from
raising the statute of limitations where the defendant insurer had admitted liability and promised
compensation, with the only unresolved issue being the amount of damages. See Plaintiffs Brief
at 9. Contrary to the plaintiffs assertion, the present case is far different than Rice. There is
absolutely no evidence in the record that the insurer of the defendant admitted liability or
promised compensation. In fact, there is no evidence at all of any communication with the
defendants insurer. By mere coincidence, both parties in this case have the same insurer.
However plaintiff only offers letters from her own no-fault insurance adjustor which showed that
she was receiving information regarding first party no-fault insurance coverage, and having
nothing to do with the defendant Elton Hall or any liability claim. The present case is further

19

distinguishable from Rice in that the plaintiff in Rice was not represented by counsel prior to the
statute of limitation running.
Subsequent to Rice, this Court decided Cornwall v. Larsen. 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977),
which considered the situation where a plaintiff asserted that an insurance adjuster had lulled him
into a false sense of security by requesting medical information regarding the physical condition
of the plaintiff. In opposing summary judgment, both at the trial level and on a appeal, the
plaintiff relied on Rice v. Granite School District. This Court in Cornwall found the case to be
different from Rice. The Court stated:
In the present case, the plaintiff had counsel who had timely filed the claim and
who was well acquainted with the statute which provided that a complaint must be
filed within one year after a claim is denied. The actions of the adjuster under
those circumstances were not such as would warrant a conclusion that the clear
mandate of the statute may not be followed.
Cornwall. 571 P.2d at 927. In the present case, the plaintiff was represented, as the record
reflects, by counsel who handled the case for one year prior to the statute running. Nonetheless,
no lawsuit was filed until after the statute ran. Likewise, there were no ongoing negotiations.
Since the plaintiff was represented by counsel long before the statute ran, and because there were
no assurances made by an adjuster regarding any liability payment, the statute of limitation of
four years should not be ignored.

20

VI.

THIS COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING THE APPEAL AS TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WAS WELL FOUNDED
By order dated October 2,1995, this Court granted defendant's motion for summary

disposition and dismissed plaintiffs appeal from the trial courts' summary judgment. Plaintiff
recognized that because Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is not specifically listed as a tolling
motion under Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 60(b) motions do not toll
the time for appeal. The plaintiff claims that such a holding would be inconsistent with this
Court's decision in Gallardo v. Bolinder. 800 P.2d 816 (Utah 1990). However, a careful reading
of the Gallardo decision shows that this Court, as well as the Utah Court of Appeals, has been
consistent in its application of Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to post trial
motions.
It is true that the Gallardo decision states:
A motion from relief from judgment, if filed within ten days after the entry of
judgment, will be treated as a post judgment motion tolling the time for appeal.
I d at 817. However, to rely on that statement without reading the rest of the decision and
considering subsequent case law would lead to an improper application of Rule 4(b). Instead, the
more salient language from Gallardo is as follows:
If the nature of the motion can be ascertained from the substance of the
instrument, we have heretofore held that an improper caption is not fatal to that
motion.

21

Gallardo. 800 P.2d at 817 (citing Armstrong Rubber Company v. Bastien. 657 P.2d 1346 (Utah
1983) (citing Howard v. Howard. 11 Utah 2d 149,152, 356 P.2d 275, 276 (I960))). It should
also be noted that Gallardo stands primarily for the position that an unsigned minute entry is not
a final judgment for the purposes of appeal. It is really upon that basis that the Gallardo court
held that the notice of appeal was timely.
The ruling in this case is consistent with numerous decisions which hold that the
appellate courts look to the substance of the pleading in order to determine whether it tolls the
time for appeal. See Watkiss & Campell v. FOA & Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). The
differences are easy to identify. In Gallardo. the Court was faced with a pro se litigant who had
miscaptioned a pleading. In substance, the motion could have been considered as one for a new
trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, not only was
plaintiffs motion styled as one pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but
the memorandum in support of the motion shows that the motion was, in substance as well as
form, brought to set aside a judgment. Plaintiff specifically argued in support of her Rule 60(b)
motion that she should be granted relief from the judgment pursuant to subsections (1) and (7) of
the rule. Unlike the case of Watkiss & Campbell, the trial court in this case did not treat
plaintiffs motion as a motion for a new trial, but it is clear from the order that the court treated
the motion as one under Rule 60(b). (R. 157)

Given these facts, this Court is not presented

with a miscaptioned pleading, and therefore this Court was correct in concluding that the 60(b)
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motion did not toll the time for appeal. As a result, the underlying summary judgment is not at
issue.
CONCLUSION
Because plaintiff has stated no viable reason for reversal, the trial court should be
affirmed. The trial court's conclusion that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 is not applicable was
correct. The courts conclusion was correct because (1) there was no evidence in the record to
support any conclusion that the defendant was absentfromthe state at any time, and (2) § 78-1235 does not apply to toll the statute of limitations because of the Non-Resident Motor Vehicle
Act. This Court's order dismissing the appeal as to summary judgment was well founded, and
now this Court should sustain the trial court's denial of plaintiff s Rule 60(b) motion.
Accordingly, the trial court should be affirmed.
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Addendum A

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts If the record
and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time
of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court
orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal
is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud,
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6)the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (7) any other reason within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2),
(3), or (4), not more that 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court the entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed
in these rules or by an independent action.

78-12-35. Effect of absence from state.
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, the action
may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If after
a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time
limited for the commencement of the action.

